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HAMMETT v. PHILADELPHIA, 65 PA. 146
This is a scire facias upon an assessment on the lot of
tlamrnett, for the cost of paving the street, Broad street,
on which it abutted. The Act of Assembly of March 23,
1866 authorized the city of Philadelphia to pave Broad
Street with such paving as the councils deemed best, and
to enact such ordinances as "may require the cost of said
improvements to be paid for by the owners of property
abutting on said street."
An ordinance was passed in
pursuance of this authority directing that between Willow Street and Columbia Avenue, the street from curb
to curb should be laid with Nicholson pavement, the cost
of which, save at the street intersections, should "be paid
by the owners of property abutting upon said street."
The contract to be niYade for the paving was to limit the
cost to $4 per square yard. The contractor was to enter into an obligation to the city to keep the street in
good order for three years. The area of paving done in
front of Hamnett's lot was 1007 26-100 square yards.
The assessment against him was $4029.04.
Hammet's affidavit of defense alleged that, when the
contract for Nicholson pavement was made, the street
was well paved with cobble stones, in the style universally
adopted for years past for the best paved avenues, and
that the paving was then in good order; and that the cost
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of this earlier pavement had been paid by the then owner
of the lot.
The affidavit averred that the Act of Assembly of
March 23, 1866 violated the constitution of the state, (a)
in that it authorized the taking of the defendant's property
and the application of it to the public use of paying a
debt of the city, i. e. its debt to the contractors, and without making compensation or securing that any should be
made; and (b) in that it delegated to the city councils
power to impose the entire burden of a general unrestricted work, destined for the uses and purposes of the public,
and the benefits and advantages which will enure to them,
"on the property, when it had already been subjected to the
contribution for paying usual to all other city properties."
On Oct. 24th, 1868 judgment was entered for the
plaintiff for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, and
Hammett took a
damages were assessed at $4462.14.
writ of error. The judgment was reserved, Sharswood, J.,
writing the opinion, but two judges, Read and Williams,
dissented, Reed, J., writing a dissenting opinion, and also
a supplement thereto.
We shall attempt to state as briefly as possible, the
positions taken by Sharswood, J., in the majority opinion.
1. The legislature may constitutionally confer on municipal corporations the power of assessing the cost of local
improvements upon the properties benefited. Reference
is made to McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 W. 292, which
holds that an act is constitutional which causes an assessment on properties benefited by the opening of a street
of the damages caused
(not necessarily abutting on it)
thereby to other properties.
Then Fenelon's Petition, 7
Pa. 173 and Extension of Hancock Street, 18 Pa. 26, holding the same doctrine, are cited. In these cases the properties to be charged were not necessarily those on the street;
they were charged, not by a foot front rule, but in proportion to benefits received; which benefits had to be estimated by viewers or others.
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2. On the same principle, says Sharswood, J., the cost
of various improvements of curbing, paving, sewers, may
be put on lots fronting on the streets in which these improvements are made, in proportion to their respective
fronts. Six cases are cited from the State Reports.
3. These cases are cases of local taxation for local
purposes, or "taxation on the benefits conferred, and not
beyond the extent of these benefits." No clause, observes
the justice, in the constitution (prior to the present one)
But, the
restricts the taxing power of the legislature.
"very nature of things," acts as a super-constitution, and
imposes the condition that the taxing power cannot be exe ted, under legislative authority, by a municipality, for
general purposes. Otherwise the legislature might lay the
whole expense of government "upon the shoulders of one
man." That, says the justice, would be confiscation, not
taxation, and confiscation to the commonwealth, except
-or the life of the offender, is not possible. The subtle observation of Black, C. J., is quoted that the whole of the
public burden cannot be thrown on a single individual.
The power to do so is "not excepted from the powers of
the legislature, because they did not pass by the general
grant of legislative power."
4. Reference is made to the difference between the
right of taxation and that of eminent domain. The disTaxation exacts
tinction "is clear and well defined."
money or services from individuals, as and for their respective shares of contribution to any public burden. Private property taken for public use by right of eminent domain, is taken not as the owner's share or contribution to
a public burden, but as so much beyond his share." Quoting Field, J., of California, that money cannot be taken by
eminent domain, Sharswood, J., thinks that "there may be
occasions in which money may be taken by the state" under
Judge Ruggles thinks the right to
the eminent domain.
exact money is confined to time of war. Sharswood thinks
"Whenever a local assessthis limitation unnecessary.

Dickinson Law Review
ment upon an individual is not grounded upon and measured by the extent of his particular benefit, it is pro tanto
a taking of his private property for public use without any
provision for compensation." "It is the solemn duty of the
judiciary, under our constitution, to guard and protect the
right of property as well from indirect attacks under any
specious pretext, as from open and palpable invasion."
5. The justice next considers two cases which may
seem irreconcilable with the view just expressed.
In
Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, an Act of Assembly
authorizing the city of Philadelphia to subscribe for 10,000
shares of the Hempfield R. R. Co., to borrow the money
to pay therefor, and to make provision for the repayment
of the money borrowed, out of taxation, was held to be
constitutional. Sharswood remarks that this decision had
become unimportant because it had been in effect reversed
by the 1st amendment of the constitution of 1857.
The other case is that of Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. 258.
The court house and jail of Bradford County, in Towanda.
had been destroyed by fire. An Act of Assembly required
the county commissioners for a series of years to add the
sum of $500 to the usual county rates and levies of the
borough of Towanda, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of erecting the court house, then in process of
building. Gibson, J., maintains that the act is constitutional, remarking "the advantages of a county town are too
well appreciated not to make every village use all its exertions to have a court house provided for its benefit and
convenience. Without a court house to replace the burnt
one, Towanda could not have remained the seat of justice;
and as its in-habitants profited by, not only the disbursements of the tax among them but a permanent increase of
their business and an appreciation of their property, they
were morally bound to contribute in proportion." Hence
Kirby was compelled to pay $3.75, the additional tax assessed on him. Sharswood, J., contents himself by observing that the only real question here was the "application
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of the principle," viz., that a few shall not be taxed for the
benefit of more. They must be themselves benefited by
the tax.
6. "Assessments on property peculiarly benefited by
local improvements and in consideration of such benefits,
are constitutional--thus far have the judicial decisions in
this and other states gone, and no further." After citing
ten cases from other states, Sharswood, J., quotes from
Peck, J., of Ohio, to the effect that "the right to impose
such taxes is based upon a presumed equivalent, but it by
ito means follows that there must be in fact such full eqdivalent in every instance, or that its absence will render the
assessment invalid. The rule of apportionment, whether
by the front foot or a percentage upon the assessed valuation, must be uniform, affecting all the owners of all the
property abutting on the street alike."
7. The Justice, after quoting Peck, J., of Ohio, cites
.s if it agr.eed, Con:monwvcalth v. Woods, 44 Pa. 113.
The Act of Assembly authorized, on the construction of a
sewer, the councils of Pittsburg to impose the costs on
the properties benefited. Councils weire to appoint three
persons to assess the expense on properties benefited. If
their assessment was approved by councils, it became a
lien. In a scire facias on a lien thus obtained, the defendant
attempted to show that his lot obtained no benefit from the
sewer, and he convinced the jury.
Read, J., in the Supreme Court held the dccizio-i of the three viewers and
of the council was conclusive. The advantage of an imposing principle that taxes must be for benefits is reduced
to zero, when tacked to it is the provision that whether,
and if to any, to what extent, it is benefited shall be conclusively decided by the councils of a city that have ordained the improvements in revision of the report of their
three appointees.
Judge Sharswocd s'.;ys he has met with two cases
in which it was attempted "though fortunately without
success" to make the owners personally liable in assess-
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ments beyond the value of their lots, cases which show
how dangerous and liable to abuse is the power of special taxation despite all the guards which are thrown
around it. In one of these cases the property was appraised for revenue purposes at $1400. It was rendered
worthless by the grading of a street, yet the attempt was
made to make the owners personally liable for $1989.54.
8. The justice now undertakes to apply the principles stated. The original paving of a street brings property bounding upon it into the market as building lots.
Before that it is a road, not a street. It is a local improvement with benefits almost exclusively peculiar to the
adjoining proper-ties. When a pavement has once been
laid, all the benefits peculiar to -the locality, have been received. Hence for a second paving, or for a repairing of
the first pavement, no assessment can be properly made
upon the adjacent property.
But let us ask ourselves, if the pavement has benefited the lots will not a second pavement benefit them,
if the first pavement has worn out and the benefits brought
by it have disappeared? Should not a distinction be made
between a second paving, when unnecessary, and a second
paving when necessary?
9. Assuming that abutting properties are benefited
by a first paving, in what degree are they? They might
be charged with the expense of the paving, in proportion
to their area, or to their market value, or to the addition to
their value caused by the paving. The method pursued in
the case, was to distribute the cost according to the footfrontage of the lots. Sharswood, J., observes "Perhaps no
fairer rule can be adopted than the proportion of foot
front, although there must be some inequalities if the lots
differ in situation and depth. Appraising their market
value is open to favoritism or corruption and other objections." We are to console ourselves for the manifest inequalities of the foot front rule, by reflecting that "No sys-
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tem of taxation which the wit of man ever devised has
been found perfectly equal."
10. The Act of Assembly of May 23, 1866 under which
the paving was done, authorizes the councils of Philadelphia to require the "cost of said improvements to be paid
for by the owners of property abutting upon said street."
The cost might be less than, or more than the benefits conferred. Would the legislative decision that the costs shall
be paid by lot owners be taken to be a decision that the
costs do not exceed the benefits; and, if so, would this decision preclude contestation of its accuracy? Sharswood,
J. is silent on this question. To impose the costs on property, in excess of the benefits to it, would be to depart
from the principle laid down that the assessment must be
"grounded upon and measured by the extent" of the benefit.
11. Having said that "repairing streets is as much a
part of the ordinary duties of the municipality-for the
general good-as cleaning, watching and lighting," Sharswood observes that the case before him is still clearer than
Broad street had been paved
that of simple repairing.
with cobble stones (as all the streets were) only a few
years before. Whatever advantage there was in owning
property on so wide and handsome a street was paid for
by him in the cost assessed on him. The pavement has
not been worn out; there was no necessity to tear it up
Mr. Hammett filed a
and substitute another.
bill to restrain the doing of the repaving, before it began. He has not been guilty of laches.
To the suggestion that the new pavement was to the
interest of Hamnett, the reply is he was to be the judge
He may have been specially
of that, not this court.
benefited, but that he was is not shown by the evidence.
The justice adds that the case is not to be decided by
the "particular results," but "on general principles which
can work with safety and advantage to the public in all
other cases; which means possibly, that if repaving was
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allowed at the expense of the property, in a majority of
cases it would be detrimental to the owner, and therefore
the principle must be adopted that evidence shall not be
heard, in any particular case, that the repaving was beneficial."
The object of the repaving was not to keep Broad
street for the advantage and comfort of those who live on
it, and for ordinary business and travel, but to make a
great public drive-a pleasure ground-along which elegant equipages may disport of an afternoon. The preamble of the Act of March 23, 1866 indicates this.
The next step might be to compel the properties to pay
for monuments, statuary and fountains placed on the
street.
The conclusion reached is thus expressed. Local assessments can only be constitutional when imposed to pay
for local improvements clearly conferring special benefits
on the properties assessed, and to the extent of those benefits. They cannot be so imposed when the improvement
is either expressed, or appears to be, for general public
benefit.
Abutting Property
Whether imposing cost of paving on property benefited, which does not abut on the street, is permissible to the
legislature is in doubt. That the Act of May 16, 1891
does not allow it is asserted."
In order that A's land shall abut on a street, it is
not necessary that it extend beyond the street line to the
2
center of the street.
It matters not how short the let which lies between
the street and the ground on which the assessment is atWMorewood Avenue, 159 Pa. 20; Forty-fifth Street, 165 Pa. 8.

Cf. as to sewers, Beechwood Avenue Sewer Cases, 179 Pa. 490;
Park Avenue Sewers, 169 Pa. 433.
2Thirteenth Street, 16 Super. 127.
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tempted; nor, that the intervening lot is exempt from assessment. A railroad way, 47 ft. wide, skirted along a
street. This way could not be assessed for the paving,
being a highway, nor could the tract separated by it from
the street, under a statute authorizing the charging of the
expense of paving to the owner of property fronting
thereon, in proportion to the front owned by each.'
Some of the paving for which the assessment is made,
must be made in front of the property assessed. If, e. g.,
only half a square is paved, lots facing the other half could
not be assessed. 4
Not the cost of the work in front of
A's property, only, is to be separately ascertained and assessed, but the cost of the entire work embraced in one undertaldng is to be distributed upon all the lots fronting on
it, proportionately to their areas.
Part of the property which fronts on the street when
the work is done may cease to front on it by division between two or more owners: A owning a lot 160 feet deep
may sell to B 60 feet remote from the street. This sold
part will not abut, though, as part of the entire lot, it formerly did abut. The division of the lot, after the work is
done will not withdraw the remote part from the assessment which will be on the entire lot.5
Foot FrontRule
Sharswood, J. said in Hammett v. Philadelphia "Perhaps no fairer rule can be adopted than the proportion of
feet front, although there must be some inequalities if the
lots differ in situation and depth." If they differ in situation! They necessarily so differ.
"Whatever doubt
might have been originally entertained of it as a substitute,
which it really is, for actual assessment by jurors or as3

Philadelphia v. Eastwick, 35 Pa. 75.

4Cf. Hutchinson v. Pittsburg, 72 Pa. 320; Rankin v. Pittsburg,

7 Dist. 489.
sAllegheny City v. King, 18 Super. 182; Philadelphia v. Nock,
12 Super- 44.
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sessors under oath, it ha s been so often sanctioned by decision, it would ill become us," said Agnew, J., "now to
unsettle its foundation by disputing its principle." 6 Potter, J. thought the propriety of the foot front rule "definYet Mitchell, J. was of opinion that the
itely settled."'
just rule would be to assess the benefits
the
only
best, if not
by the difference in the market value of the land before and
after the making of the improvement on the street.5
Sharswood, J. distrusts any plan which requires appraisement, "as open to favoritism or corruption and other objections." That the foot front rule does not assess cost
according to benefits in some cases is clearly recognized;
as when the lots vary in depth;1O that its producing just
results is too improbable when properties vary very much
in value, out of all proportion to their boundaries on streets
or roads, e. g. in rural neighborhoods, is recognized."
Cities or boroughs may embrace land which is rural, and
which cannot be constitutionally assessed for paving of
streets, etc., by the foot front rule. Whether any particular tract is rural should be determined by the jury,12 except when the facts are admitted or are under the evidence
free from doubt. It then becomes a question of law for
the court, "' to be decided not by the jury but by it. A
clear and satisfactory definition of the ruralness of property which will exempt it from subjection to the foot front
That it is used for farm
rule, was, in 1896, wanting.'4
6

Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 (1871).
'Harrisburg v. McPherran, 200 Pa. 343.
sWitmnan v. Reading, 169 Pa. 375.
9
llammett v- Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146.
lOWitman v. Reading, 169 Pa. 375; Hammett v. Philadelphia,
65 Pa. 146.
v. Soles, 165 Pa. 628; 178 Pa. 363.
-"MeKeespoit

"aPhiladelphia v, Gindhart, 48 Super. 648; Washington Avenue,
69 Pa. 352; See]y v. Pittsburg, 83 Pa. 360.
"lReading v- O'Reilly, 169 Pa. 366; Philadelphia v. Gindhart,
648.
48 Super.
' 4McKeesport v. Soles. 178 Pa. 363.
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purposes, that it has never been laid out into building lots,
is, according to White, J., not decisive that it is exempt."
"Generally speaking," says the Supreme Court, "the inquiry as to what is rural and what is urban property,
within the meaning of the law, is one to which no hard
It necessarily deand fast rule can be safely applied.
pends largely on the special circumstances of each case."
The Act of May 23, 1889, P. L. 277, authorizes cities
of the third class to provide for the payment of the cost
of paving streets "by the owners of real estate bounding
and abutting thereon, by an equal assessment on said property in proportion to the number of feet the same fronts
on the street." The constitutionality of this provision has
been affirmed.16 The legislature may then, without hearing the parties to be affected, decide that the benefits to
be produced by the paving, to the owners, will be equal
to the cost, and that the owners will share these benefits, proportionately to the frontage of their lands.
Cost of Repairing
The cost of repairing a street must be borne by thq
public.17 Though the ordinance for original paving provides that the lot owners shall be assessed not only for
its cost but for the cost of repairing becoming necessary
in five years, the costs for such repairing cannot be assessed on the property owners. 8 The contract for paving
may require the contractor to repair the street for a
series of years. If the contract price embraces the original cost of the paving, and that of repairs which may
15McKeesport v. Soles, 179 Pa. 363.
'OHarrisburg v. Funk, 14 Super. 495; Harrisburg v. McPherran,
14 Super. 473. The case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U- S. 269,
is shown not to condemn the foot front rule in Harrisburg v. McPherran, 14 Super. 473; 200 Pa. 343. Cf. Wright v. Davidson, 181
U. S. 371; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324.
'TWilliamsport v. Hughes, 21 Super. 443; Philadelphia v. Pemberton, 208 Pa. 214; Wister v. Philadelphia, 111 Pa. 604; Hammett
v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 364.
28Scranton v. Sturges, 202 Pa. 182.
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become necessary the assessment oi the lots for the
whole of this contract price, would be, in part an assessment for repairs, and pro tanta but not entirely invalid."9
The contractor's agreement to make repairs may be a mere
guaranty of the perfection of his original work, which, if
perfect, would not require repaving within a comparatively shoit time.
In that case, no abatement from the contract price, assessed on the proprietor, will be made for
the stipulation to repair. A stipulation that the contractors shall keep the street in repair for five20 or seven 2
years would not justify the reduction of the contract price,
for the purpose of assessing it on the lots, in the absence
of evidence that the time was not a reasonable test of the
soundness of the original work. Even when the contract
required the keeping of the pavement in repair for 10
years, it would be for a jury to say whether the contract
required more than a guaranty of soundness of work,
and, if so, by what amount the assessable cost should
be less than the contract price. 22
Cost of the Fi'rst Pavement Only
In Hammett v. Philadelphia, Broad Street, says
Sharswood, C. J., had been paved "only a few years ago."
"Without any pretence that it had been worn out and
required to be replaced by another, it was torn up and a
new and very expensive wooden pavement substituted."2
It might be suspected that the principle latent in the
justice's mind was that the cost of the unnecessary re19 Williansport v. Hughes, 21 Super. 443.
20
Piladelphia v. Pernberton, 208 Pa. 214.
2lWilliamsport v. Hughes, 21 Super. 443.
2
'Erie v. Grant, 21 Super. 461. In Leake v. Philadelphia, 150
Pa. 643, bill to enjoin the paving, the contractor filed an affidavit
denying that there Nvas any increase in the contract price to cover
cost of keeping the street in repair.
2sWilliamsport v. Beck, 128 Pa. 147; Harrisburg v. Segelbaum,
151 Pa. 172' Boyer v. Reading, 151 Pa. 185; Greensburg v- Laird,
138 Pa. 533.
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newal of a pavement, could not be assessed upon property
owners. The view prevailing, however is, that after a
paving, any later paving, however long after the first,
and without regard to the reasonableness or necessity of
the later paving, must be made at the public expense, and
not at the expense of the property owners. And even
though the first paving was done at the public expense
or at the expense of a turnpike company,24 a fortiori when
it was done at the expense of the property owners, 25 the
expense of a second paving cannot be imposed on them.
What Is a First Paving?
The property owners objecting to paying for the paving of a street on the ground that the street had been
previously paved, it is sometimes disputable whether work
previously done was a paving. Many things may be done
on a street in order to make it more suitable for travel,
which would not be deemed a paving. It is said that macadanizing is prima facie not a paving for a city street6
and therefore does not prevent the charging of the cost of
a subsequent paving on property owners,2 7 but, even in a
city, it may be a paving, if put down by the city, or adopted by it, as a pavement, after being made by a turnpike
company or other instrumentality, for the purpose of
"turning a road into a street."
The municipal act of
adoption or recognition as a paved street is the test for
determining whether a prior macadamizing precludes the
imposition of the cost of a future paving on properties.2
2

'Philadelphia v. Eddleman, 169 Pa. 451; Philadelphia v. Gowen,
202 Pa. 453.
2
5Hamnmett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146; Philadelphia v. Ehret,
153 Pa. 1.
SeLeake v. Philadelphia, 171 Pa. 125.
=Philadelphia v- Baker, 140 Pa. 11; Philadelphia v. Dibeler,
147 Pa. 261; Philadelphia v. Hill, 166 Pa. 211; Leake v. Philadelphia, 150 Pa. 643; Philadelphia v. Ehret, 153 Pa. 1.
2
3Leake v. Philadelphia, 171 Pa. 125; Philadelphia v. Eddleman, 169 Pa. 452.
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Says Mitchell, J.,-- "A first pavement therefore, in the
legal sense, which exempts the abutting property owner
from liability for any subsequent improvement may be
defined generally as one that is put down originally or
adopted or acquiesced in subsequently by the municipal
authority for the purpose and with the intent of changing
an ordinary road into a street. It may be of macadam
or of anything else. That is a matter of evidence only.
If the purpose and intent be wanting a mere surfacing of
the road, however carefully or expensively done, will not
be a paving, but if the intent and purpose are present, or
to be fairly inferred, then there is a paving whatever the
material may be."
Recognizing that a road is a highway, -and doing
things on it to make it safe and convenient for travel,
is not such recognition "of the existing surface as a pavement, as precludes a later paving at the expense of the
property owners." A city, e. g., may repair a plank road so
as to keep it safe for travel without adopting the planking as a pavement, so as to exempt property owners from
the cost of a later pavement. 0 The fact that the legislature authorizes a turnpike, and its construction is approved by commissioners appointed by the governor, is
not equivalent, the city subsequently acquiring the rights of
the turnpike company, to an adoption by the city of the
macadam as a paving so as to prevent the charging of the
properties with the cost of a subsequent paving."

20Philadelphia v. Eddleman, 169 Pa. 452.
30

East Street, 210 Pa. 539; Harrisburg v- Funk, 200 Pa. 348.
3iDick v. Philadelphia, 197 Pa. 467.
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MOOT COURT
WHITE ET AL v. NASHVILLE WATER COMPANY
Corporations--Right of Individual to Restrain Ultra Vires Exercise
of Power of Eminent Domain
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Water Company was incorporated for the purpose of supplying water to the borough of Nashville and its inhabitants.
A
street of the borough is continued beyond the borough limits, and
twenty houses are built on this extra-borough road.
The company has for a year been supplying water to dwellers in these"
houses. The plaintiffs, persons whose water has been taken under
eminent domain, file this bill to enjoin, (1) against continuing to
take water; (2) against continuing to supply the houses.
MacGregor, for the plaintiff.
Paul, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HARMAN, J. The Water Company was incorporated for the
purpose of furnishing water to the borough of Nashville and its
inhabitants, and also had the right of eminent domain, so there is
no doubt as to its right of condemning the waters in question for
the purpose above stated.
But the Water Company is furnishing
water to the dwellers of twenty houses outside of the borough
limits and this raises the question whether such an act will operate
to make the entire appropriation unlawful.
It is argued that a Water Company, incorporated to furnish
rater to a municipality, has no right to furnish water in adjacent
territory. Bly v. White Doer Mountain Water Company, 197 Pa.
80, is cited as authority for this position. On the other hand it is
contended by the defendant that the Water Company was incorpo.
rated for the purpose of furnishing water to the inhabitants of
Nashville, and what it did by furnishing a small supply of water
to the few houses outside of the borough limits was merely incidental to its main purpose. Mier v. Citizens Water Company, 250 Pa.
536.
Ih the latter case above mentioned the same question that.
confronts us was well decided, and the distinction between Bly v.
White Deer Mountain Water Company and Mier v. Citizens Water
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Company pointed out, and the same argument applies here. In commenting on Bly v. White Deer Mountain Water Company, 197 Pa.
80, the Chief Justice in Bland v. Tipton Water Company, 222 Pa.
285, among other things said:
"What was enjoined was the taking of the water of the creek
for the purpose of directly supplying the same to the public in
townships and municipalities other than the one in which the Water
Company was authorized to supply the same.'
In the present case the court is asked to enjoin the Water
Company against continuing to take water from the creek for the
purpose of supplying the same to the borough of Nashville, where
it is conceded that it has the right to supply water to the public,
and this is a different proposition from that of enjoining the taking
of water for the direct supply of the same to townships and municipalities where the Water Company has no right to furnish such a
supply.
Suppose we granted the contention of the plaintiff in this case,
the Water Company would be entitled to institute another proeceeding to condemn the waters in question for the purpose of supplying the inhabitants of Nashville, the only result would be to deprive
the dwellers of the twenty houses of one of the most important
necessities of life. The position of the plaintiff would be no better.
Would it be equity to force this hardship upon so many people and
yet not benefit or help anyone? The plaintiff cannot be said to
have suffered for he has an adequate remedy at law. Furthermore,
if the contention of the plaintiff in this case should prevail any
riparian owner acting upon his own initiative could enjoin a Water
Company from appropriating the waters of a stream even for a lawful corporate purpose if per chance the Water Company supplied
to any consumer outside of the limits of the territory in which it
exercised its corporate function.
It is not denied that the defendant company has, under the
franchise, the right to appropriate the waters of the stream for
the purpose of supplying the borough of Nashville, but it is argued
that under its charter it has no right to furnish water to the
twenty houses located outside of the borough limits. Under the
Act of June 19, 1871, P. L. 1360, the plaintiff has no right to question the conduct of a corporation under its charter in a collateral
proceeding. "If it exceeds its corporate powers by making an
imeproper use of the water which it takes, it is answerable to the
commonwealth alone." Blouch v. Johnstown Water Company, 247
Pa. 71. "The inquiry which the plaintiff would have the court make
under this bill is not into the rights conferred by the charter of
the Water Company, but into the conduct under the same. This
can be done only at the instance of the Commonwealth." Windsor
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Glass Co. v. Carnegie Company, 204 Pa. 469.
court's inquiry in this proceeding is to ascertain
Company does in fact possess right of franchise
For the reasons herein stated the bill is

The limits of the
whether the Water
to take the water.
dismissed.

OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The Nashville Water Company has acquired the right to take
water from a certain stream for the supply of the inhabitants of
Nashville. It has no right to supply water to people living beyond
the limits of that borough. It has nevertheless supplied certain
Does this act forfeit the right
persons living beyond the borough.
of the company? Possibly, at the suit of the State, it might be
held to work this forfeiture; but certainly not, at the suit of a private
party. The bill must plainly be dismissed so far as it asks for an
injunction against the continuance of the taking of water by the
company. Windsor Glass Co. v Carnegie Co., 204 Pa. 459; Mier v.
Water Co., 250 Pa. 536.
May the bill be entertained to enjoin against the continuance
of the supply of water to the 20 houses which are situated outside
of the borough? The learned court below has properly held that
it cannot. Bouch v. Johnstown Water Co., 247 Pa. 71.
Even at the suit of the attorney general, the court would hardly interfere with the supply of water to the 20 houses. The quantity of water thus supplied must be, relative to the whole volume
of water taken by the company, insignificant. The same quantity
of water would be taken, probably, even if this supply ceased. The
dwellers in the 20 houses would be injured by an injunction, and
nobody else appreciably benefited. The case is one to which, with
excellent reason, the principle de minimis non curat lex is applicable.

KIRK v. A COUNTY
Contracts-Effect On Valid Contract of Illegal Execution by One of
the Parties
STATEMENT OF FACTS
It contracted
The county decided to erect a court house.
with Kirk, an architect, to make plans, and give attention to the
His compensaexecution by the contractors of their contracts.
tion was to be 5 per cent of the contract cost of the building, and
One contract
to be paid in instalments as the work progressed.
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was made with X for the foundation; and Kirk received at its completion a proportional compensation.
A contract was made with X for the superstructure, the price of
which was $220,000. This would create a debt that with an existing debt would exceed 2 per cent of the assessed valuation of the
property of the county. The work was prosecuted until four-fifths
of it was done, when on a bill by ta-cpayers, alleging the illegality
of the contract, the further prosecution of it was enjoined. The
county refused to pay Y anything, and also Kirk.
Kirk sues on the contract for 5 per cent of so much of the contract price as would had been earned by the contractor, G, when
the work was arrested.
Zigmand, for the plaintiff.
Balogh, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ZAWOISKI, J. The important and controlling question in this
case is whether there can be a recovery of any amount by the
plaintiff. In other words was the contract between Kirk and the
The answer to this
county a valid one and enforceable at law?
question depends upon the fact, whether or not this contract with
Kirk was an entire and independent one from that of Y's contract.
It is conceded by both sides that the contract with Y for the
superstructure is illegal and void inasmuch as It is apparent that
if enforced it would result in an increase of the indebtedness of
the county to an amount exceeding two per cent of the assessed
valuation of the county, without the assent of the electors, which
is in violation of section 8, article 9, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
The defendant denies that there can be a recovery and contends that the plaintiff's agreement was illegal and void because
it was an entire contract and depended upon contracts to be made
subsequently to it for the amount of work to be done in the construction of the building and that it was so dependent on and collateral to the illegal contract with Y for the construction of the
superstructure, that it was itself void.
There is no doubt whatever that the county commissioners
two
successive
recommenthe power
after
are
given
dations by the grand jury, to contract for the building of a
court house. It was the duty of the county commissioners to provide a suitable court house for the county and in discharging this
duty, they are authorized to employ an architect to prepare plans
The plaintiff was employed
and specifications for the building.
by the connissioners to prepare plans and specifications and super.
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intend the construction of a suitable and proper court house. There
is nothing in the plaintiff's contract or in the facts of the case
showing that at the time the agreement was made it was contemplated by either party that a subsequent illegal contract would be
entered into by the commissioners for the construction of the building, or that they intended to exceed the constitutional limit of the
county's indebtedness in erecting the building and an assumption
of the fact is wholly arbitrary and unwarranted. Dowley v. Scheffer, 13 N. Y. Sup. 552.
There is no evidence that at the time the plaintiff's contract
was made, the county did not have ample funds to erect the buildings, and there is nothing to show that when he entered into the
contract and prepared the plans, the plaintiff knew or had reasons
to believe that the county would not be able to provide sufficient
funds in the manner provided by law for the completion of the
building.
The plaintiff had a right to assume that the board would keep
within the requirements of the Constitution as well as of the law
,n the construction of the building.
It is not pretended that the plaintiff's contract offended the
Constitution by erecting a debt exceeding the constitutional limit.
The contract does not describe the building to be erected, and does
not state the cost of the building. It fixed no definite sum as
plaintiff's compensation, but made it depend on the cost of the
building, which it must be presumed would not violate the Constitution. His compensation was to be 5 per cent of the cost price
of the building. A contract by a municipality which does not fix the
amount of the liability from its date, does not create a present indebtedness within the meaning of the constitutional restriction on
municipal indebtedness. 28 Cyc. 1540.
The contract with Kirk was clearly within the power of commissioners to make and was legal and binding on both parties when
it was made. For there is no evidence in the case that Kirk knew
or had reasons to know that the commissioners would enter an illegal contract for the construction of the building.
The plaintiff's agreement when made was valid and binding
and did not become illegal by the subsequent action of the county
authorities in making an illegal contract with Y. He was not
concerned with the ultimate cost of the building and it did not enter
into his contract, except as it fixed his compensation. An architect is not required to see that the county subsequently observes the
law in contracting with others and does not unlawfully increase the
debt limit in letting any or all of its contracts. It cannot be said
that under the facts of this case that the plaintiff even suspected
that the contract with Y was invalid; on the contrary he had the
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right to assume and did assume that having a valid contract with
the county for his service, the commissioners were not exceeding
their powers in the construction of the building.
"Where an agreement is lawful on its face or is capable of
being executed in a lawful way, and the intention of one of the
parties is that it be so executed, he is entitled to enforce it notwithstanding the other party intended an illegal act, if he was
unaware of the illegal intention." 9 Cyc. 570. In 36 N. Y. 235,
we have the following: "If the contract was legal when made, it
would not be made illegal by the misconduct on part of the plaintiff in carrying it out." Barry v. Copen, 151 Mass. 99; Lord
Howden v. Simpson, 10 Adolphus and Ellis 793.
Therefore under
the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff is entitled to recover although the commissioners intended when his contract was executed to create a debt exceeding its constitutional limit in the
erection of the building.
It would be very absurd to say that, prior to the time that Y
commenced work under his contract, the plaintiff was rendering
his services under .Y's contract. Prior to the contract with Y the
plaintiff prepared the plans and specifications, and superintended
the construction of the foundation by X whose contract is not attacked for illegality. There is no reason, legal or moral why recovery should not be had for these services. It is true that Kirk
at the completion of the foundation received the proportional compensation, to which he was legally entitled. The remainder of his
services for which he seeks to recover was rendered in superintending the construction of the supekstructure by Y, until the work
was enjoined. The service was performed under his own legal contract and not in pursuance of Y's invalid contract. He was not
compelled to rely upon Y's contract for his compensation but on
his own. The only reference to Y's contract that might be made
is to establish the amount of work and total cost of construction
up to the time the injunction was issued, but these facts may be
proven without reference to this contract.
The plaintiff's contract was at the most only indirectly connected with Y's contract and did not require its aid to warrant
a -recovery. In such cases the contract is not affected -by the il.
legal transaction and an action may be maintained.
Swan v.
Scott, 11 S. and R. 155; Scott v. Duff, 14 Pa. 18; Wright v. Pipe

Line Co., 101 Pa. 204.
"An agreement will be enforced, even if it is incidentally or indirectly connected with an illegal transaction, provided it Is sup.
ported by an independent consideration, or if the plaintiff will not
require the aid of the illegal transaction to make out his ease."
Sauer v. McKees Rock District, 243 Pa. 294.
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The case of Sauer v. McKees Rock District, 243 Pa. 294, is similar to the case at bar, and there it was held that the contract
of the architect was a separate and independent contract from that
of the building contractor which was invalid, and he was entitled to
recover. In Harlow v. Boro. of Beaver Falls, 188 Pa. 263, it was
held that the borough has power under the general borough laws
to provide a supply of water for its inhabitants, and where it has
entered into a contract with an engineer to supply plans and
specifications for water works, and the work has been done under
the contract, and subsequently the Supreme Court enjoins the
borough from building the water works because of the existing contract of the borough with a private water company, the injunction does not render the contract ultra vires, the subject matter being entirely within the municipal functions of the borough
and the engineer may recover under his contract for work actually
done.
Where a party has partly performed an entire contract and
is prevented from completing performance by the act of the other
party or by the law, he may recover in an action on the contract,
and the measure of his damages is the contract price less the cost
of completing the work.
Harlow v. Beaver Falls Boro., 188 Pa.
263; Imperial Coal Co. v. Port Royal Coal Co., 135 Pa. 45. In this
case the plaintiff having already received a proportional compensation at the completion of the foundation, he is entitled to recover
5 per cent of so much as would have been earned by Y when the
work was arrested.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREIE COURT
The authorities cited in the opinion of the learned court below
justify the decision which he has rendered.
The facts of the
present case and the reasons given by the learned court below are
so similar to the facts in Saner v. McKees Rocks School District,
243 Pa. 294, and to the opinion of the learned court in that case,
that we affirm the judgment in the present case without further
comment.
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GRIENER'S ESTATE
C,ntruction of Wills-Vested and Contingent Remainders
sumption of Vesting

-

Prev

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Griener devised his farm to his son Edmund for life; and then
to his, the testator's heirs. At the time of his death, he left three
sons, John, Charles, and Edmund. John and Charles conveyed their
interest to Homes, and subsequently died.
Edmund has died, leaving a son Henry to survive, who claims
the whole land.
Reiser, for the plaintiff.
Rorer, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HESKETT, J. So far as we are able to determine from the
facts of this case, the plaintiff is the sole surviving heir of his,
grandfather, Griener, who made the devise under which this action
is brought.
The important question for determination and the one upon
which the plaintiff's right of recovery depends, is whether -the remainder to John and Charles vested in interest at the time of the
testator's death, or was this a devise to those heirs of the testator
who survived Edmund, the holder of the life estate? This question
founded upon analogous facts seems to be settled in many jurisdictions. Thus in Childs v. Russel, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 16, the court
held: "Where a bequest is made to one or more for life and remainder to the testator's heirs, the bequest is to those who are such
heirs at the time of his (the testator's) decease, unless there are
words indicating a clear intention that it shall go to those who
may be the heirs at the time of the happening of the contingency
upon which the estate is to be distributed." The case of Brown
v. Lawrence, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 390, is to a like effect. This is also
the Pennsylvania rule. "It is well settled as a general rule of
construction that a devise or bequest to heirs or heirs-at-law of a
testator, or to his next of kin, will be construed as referring to
those who are such at the time of the testator's decease, unless
Buzby's.
a different intention is plainly manifested 'by the will.
Appeal, 69 Pa. 111; Stewart's Estate, 147 Pa. 383; Wood v. Schoen,
216 Pa. 425.
It will readily be seen from these decisions that unless this
will manifested a clear Intention on the part of -the testator to the
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contrary, the defendant's assignees took a vested remainder at the
death of their father. The will reads "his farm -to his son Edmund for life, and then to his, the testator's heirs." To what does
the word "then" refer? This question has also been determined.
"The use of the word 'then' as introductory to a limitation to the testator's right heirs, is not sufficient to show that the testator intended to limit the estate to those who should be such at the time
of the happening of the contingency." Buzby's Appeal, supra. Also
"The word 'then' us introductory of a limitation to testator's heirs
is not to be understood as an adverb of time, or as indicating anything else than the event in which the heirs are to take." Stewart's
Estate, supra. "To take" here signifies to vest in possession by
distribution.
That the defendant acquired title to the interests of John and
Charles by the transfer is also decided in Harrison v. Lees, 181 Pa.
225. "A vested remainder is susceptible of transfer to the same extent as an estate in possession, either by conveyance inter vivos,
or by will." See also Gardiner v. Guild, 106 Mass. 25; Glidden v.
Blodgett, 38 N. H. 74.
Judgment is therefore given for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The rill of Greiner gives his land to Edmund, for life, "and
then to his, the testator's heirs." Does this mean such as are heirs
at his death, or such as will prove to be his heirs at the termination of the life estate? When the testator died, his three sons were
his heirs. When Edmund died, the brothers were already dead without issue. Edmund's son survived him. Edmund's son would be
the only heir of the testator, living at Edmund's death.
The remainder would be contingent, under one interpretation
of the %rill, but vested under the other. The law inclines to the
view that a gift is vested, and that it is not so should clearly aprear- The word "then" does not indicate a time of vesting but the
time when the remainder is to go into operation by entitling the
remainderman to an immediate possession.
The fact that Edmund, the life-tenant would also be one of the
three remaindermen, if the vesting occurred at the death of the testator has no significance. Tatham's Estate, 250 Pa. 269.
John and Charles, having vested remainders, conveyed them to
Homes. Edmund's has passed under the intestate law to his son.
Edmund's son then owns an undivided third and Homes two
undivided thirds. If the latter has not been in possession of more
than these two-thirds the learned court below has properly entered
judgment for the defendant.
Affirmed.

Dickinson Law Review
HINKLE v. ANDERSON
Non-Negotiable Notes-Validity of Assignment As To Subsequent
Attachment Creditors
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hinkle has obtained a judgment for $2000.00 against Anderson.
X owes Anderson $1000.00 on a non-negotiable promissory note. Anderson has assigned this npte to Adams who has not informed X of
the assignment. This is an attachment execution against X, who
pleads that he no longer owes the $1000.00 to Anderson, but to
Hinkle denies the validity of the assignment as to himAdams.
self.
0
Silverstone, for the plaintiff.
Swoope, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RHAWN, J. This case presents the question: Is the assignment
of a non-negotiable promissory note, without notice to the maker
thereof, valid as against a subsequent attachment creditor of the
payee? Upon reason and authority such an assignment is good,
although no notice of the assignment is given to the debtor until
after the assignment.
If it were held that the assignment to Adams -is not good it
would mean that a non-negotiable security duly transferred could
not safely be taken in payment for a debt, -s it would remain in the
hands of the assignee subject to attachments against the assignor.
First among the questions to be disposed of is: Can a nonnegotiable promissory note be assigned and what is the effect of
an assignment? "While the law has provided for the transferring
title to some instruments by indorsement, and which are consequently deemed negotiable, non-negotiable ones may also be transferred,
Pennsylbut in a different manner, they may be assigned."
vania Law of Negotiable and Non-Negotiable Instruments, (Bolles)
p. 216. Such an assignment vests in the assignee all the rights in the
note and the assignor assumes no other engagement than that the
rote is genuine. It is prima facie evidence of title and transfers the
assignor's rights at a price which is presumed to be fair, duly regarding the maker's character for and punctuality and ability to pay.
Connelly's Estate, 2 Pears. 127; Lyons v. Divelbis, 22 Pa. 185.
Upon this authority Anderson had a right to assign the note.
Plaintiff insists, however, that the assignment was in fraud of creditors. Fraud s an allegation which must be clearly and affirmative-
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ly proved.,There is not the least indication in the facts of the case
at bar of fraud. There are many cases, especially those where rewhere
assignee,
and
assignor
exists
between
lationship
circumstances
might
show
a
fraudulent
transfer,
but
even in that line of cases fraud is not presumed.
Mead v. Conroe, 113 Pa. 220; Reehling v. Byers, 94 Pa. 316; Morris v. Hineman,
9 Kulp, 498. The assignment presumes a consideration. Lyons v.
Divelbis, supra. For thes& reasons Anderson had a right to assign
and did assign the note of X, and we cannot impute fraud to the assignment without clear proof.
We now come to the question of Anderson's failure to inform
X of the assignment. Pellman and Beckley v. Hart, Cummings and
Hart, 1 Pa. 263 is a case which rules this point. In that case the
plaintiffs obtained judgment against the defendants which was duly
entered. Attachment execution was issued with summons to one
Knight, who with his wife was the maker of a certain Joint and
several single bill in favor of Daniel Beckley, one of the defendants
below. Beckley had assigned this bill to his sister. The plaintiff
below requested the court to charge as follows:
"That if the jury believe that the attachment was served on
Knight on the 20th of September, 1842, before he had any notice of
the assignment to Mary Beckley, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover."
The Court refused to give these instructions, saying, "Had
Knight paid the amount due on this note when it was attached, or
confessed judgment on it, or judgment taken against him by rule
of court for want of an appearance or otherwise, without any previous notice of the assignment to Mary Beckley, he might have
been discharged from the payment of it to her; but if it was not and
is not yet paid, and before payment or judgment against him he has
notice of the transfer, we are of the opinion that the principle contended for by the plaintiffs does not apply.
We therefore refuse
to give the instruction, and leave the cause to you for your decision
on the questions of fact raised by the evidence."
This part of the charge was one of the assignments of error
on appeal. The court below was affirmed and the case cited hag
been followed in Jarecki Mfg. Co. v. Hart, 5 Sup. 422. Aside from
these decisions it is held in other cases that the assignment of a
debt due by a third person is a good equitable transfer of the debt
as to a subsequent attaching creditor, although no notice of the assignment is given to the debtor until after the assignment.
Stevens v. Stevens, 1 Ashmead, (Pa.) 190; Canal Company v. Insurance Co., 2 Phila. 316; Noble v. Oil Company, 79 Pa. 354,
and cases cited.
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For the reason stated and upon these authorities the assignment by Anderson to Adams of the non-negotiable promissory note
of X was valid as to Hinkle. Hinkle could take what Anderson could
claim of X, but nothing more. Since the assignment to Adams must
be presumed to be equitable where no fraud is shown, Hinkle must
now look elsewhere for the satisfaction of his judgment against
Anderson. The attachment as to X -is, therefore, dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The question presented by this case is whether an assigmnent
of a non-negotiable chose in action is good as against a creditor of
the assignor who attaches the debt subsequent to the assignment, if
prior to the attachment no notice of the assignment has been given
to the garnishee.
The courts of Pennsylvania have uniformly decided this question
in favor of the assignee. LeBarre v. Doney, 53 Super. 435; Phillips
Est., 205 Pa. 525; Shepherd v. P. R. R., 29 Super. 293.
The Pennsylvania doctrine is in accord with that which prevails in the great majority of the United States (5 Corpus Juris 972,
4 Cyc. 75), and in England, (4 Halsbury 379), and has been enforced by the courts of Pennsylvania for more than one hundred
years.
See U. S. v. Vaughn, 3 Binney 392.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
RHONE'S ESTATE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wills-Effect of Insane Delusions on Testamentary Capacity
Rhone had property real and personal, worth, the forme4
$40,000, the latter $10,000.
He left a sister and a half-brother,
For some years he had delusions, e. g., that he had consumption,
that his property was fast losing its value; that it was not worth
$5,000; that he would soon be a beggar. He declared that he would
allow no difference to be nmade of whole and half blood to operate,
and therefore would make a will. (He made a will giving one-third
of his property of both sorts to the sister, one-third to the halfbrother and one-third to the children of the dead half-brother. It
was contended that the will was invalid because of the delusions;
and because his misconception of the value of the property possibly decided him to equalize the shares.
Puhak, for the plaintiff.
Salsburg, for the defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
PUDERBAUGH, J. The orthodox trend of decisions on the
subject of whether delusions of a testator affect his testimentary
capacity to such a degree that any will made is invalid, is that
his testamentary capacity is not impaired unless the delusions affected the devising of his estate. Shreiner v. Shreiner, 178 Pa. 57.
Altho the testator may be of unsound mind as to many things
it does not necessarily follow that his mind is affected as to all
things. We all have delusions and halucinations to a certain extent, but nevertheless, we are still of a sound mind and of a disposing one. In Re Ayers, 84 Neb. 16; In Re Forman, 54 Barb.
N. Y. 274
The Pennsylvania cases are" all agreed that the testamentary
caiacity is not destroyed unless the act is the direct result of the
delusions; that is, that the delusions caused the testator to make
his will in such a manner that the devises would be the result of
the delusions.
We believe that the testator here had insane delusions, but
that these delusions were not of sufficient force to affect his testamentary capacity. These delusions were: (1) that he had consumption-It is easily seen that this would not affect the devises
of the testator; (2) that his property was fast losing value-If the
testator had made up his mind to devise his property in a certain
way, this would not have caused him to make such a true, fraternal disposition of his property, share and share alike to brothers
and sisters; (3) that his property was not worth $5,000 and that
he would soon be a beggar, covered by the same reasons as the
second.
His declaration that he would not let the difference in halfblood and whole-blood prevail, that he would make a will to prevent
it, certainly shows that the testator had sufficient mental powers to understand the difference that his dying intestate .would
make in the distribution of his estate. For this reason, if for no
other, we think that he had sufficient knowledge of what he was
about to do, when he made the will. His action and statements
showed that he wished to convey knowledge of his affection for the
half-blood and declares that aforesaid affection just as great for
them as for the kin of the whole-blood.
If a man is capable ofthinking and reasoning to this extent, and
the result of his so-called delusions is not noticeable in the attendant action, he surely has sufficient capability in re his mental
strength to make a will. This question should be determined on the
evidence and on expert testimony before a jury. On the facts as
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presented in this case, we are of the opinion that judgment must
be given for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The recognized doctrine concerning the effect of delusions on
the will of the person affected with them is that the mere existence
of the delusion will not vitiate it, that he must have been "controlled by the delusion in the making of the will." Buchanan v.
Pierie, 205 Pa. 123; Ross' Appeal, 243 Pa. 119.
The learned court below has given good reasons for holding
that the delusions of the testator did not influence his disposition
of his estate. His belief that he had a disease that he did not
have, that his property was lessening in value, that it was worth
less than it really was worth, that he would soon be a beggar, has
no visible relation to his purpose to give equal interests in his
property to a sister of the whole blood, and to a brother, and the
son of a deceased brother of the half blood.
Appeal dismissed.
COOPER CO. v. BEISEL
Corporations-Conditional Subsc~ptions--Etfect of NonCompliance with Conditions
STATEMIENT OF FACTS
Officers of he plaintiff advised Beisel to purchase twenty (20)
shares of stock, and to give his note for 3 months for the price, viz.,
$1000. Beisel agreed to deliver the note to the treasurer, who was
to place it in the hands of a neutral person, to retain until Beisel
should have time to investigate the condition of the company, and
to verify the truth of the representations by which he was induced to proceed so far towards a purchase. If Beisel came to the
conclusion that the representations were untrue, he was to withdraw the note from the custodian, and be under no obligation on
account of it. Beisel's defense, when sued on the note, is that he
investigated, found the representations untrue, and demanded from
the custodian the return of the note, who refused, but handed it
to the corporation plaintiff. The court held the defense insufficient.
Clark, for the plaintiff.
Luria, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BRUNER, J. It is a well-settled rule in Pennsylvania that after a corporation is organized, it may receive conditional subscriptions for its stock, and when it does so it is bound to the perforn
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ance of the conditions contained therein.
Pittsburg, etc., R. R.
Co. v. Stewart, 41 Pa. 54; Real Estate Trust Co. v. Ritter-Conley
Co., 223 'Pa. 350; R. R. Co. v. Hickman, 28 Pa. 318. In the case
at bar the Copper Co. was a going concern, properly organized and
incorporated under the laws of the state. There is no quest'on that
it was capable of receiving conditional subscriptions to its stock.
The condition attached to Beisel's subscription was a valid one, and
it only remains to decide whether, under the facts set forth, the
condition was binding on the company at the time of this suit.
If the giving of the note by the defendant to the treasurer of
the company was a payment of the subscription, there was necessarily a waiver of the condition by Beisel.
But giving a note
is not a payment for stock; it constitutes only a promise to pay.
Payment by a note is not sufficient to render the maker a stockholder. Boyd v. Peach Bottom Ry. Co., 90 Pa. 169.
The plaintiff company here was cognizant of the terms under
which the note was given. The rights of no third parties have intervened. The note is still in the hands of the payee. This brings
up the question of whether evidence was admissible to show the
condition. In Cass v. Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co., 80 Pa. 31, evidence
was admissible for the defendant that the agent of the company
who procured his subscription agreed to hold it until he should authorize its delivery to the company. Justice Sharswood, in the
course of the opinion, said: "As general rule delivery of a bond
or deed as an escrow cannot be made to the obligee or grantee.But it is different when the condition imposes a burden on the
other party. He must then expressly or impliedly accept before
the contract becomes completely binding on the parties;" and he
admitted evidence of the agreement between the parties. Nothing
is better settled in this state than that not only can the ambiguities
of a written instrument be explained by parol, but it may, In the
same manner, be varied, added to, or even contradicted where it is
shown that but for the oral stipulations, at the time, the party
affected would not have executed it. Caley v. R. R. Co., 80 Pa. 363;
Real Estate Trust Co. v. Ritter-Conley Co., 223 Pa. 350. In the
latter case, the company was held bound by the representations of
its president and agent, whether he exceeded his authority or not.
And it was said, in Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stewart, 41 Pa. 54
that the act of the president of an incorporated company, in accepting conditional subscriptions, was binding on the company.
There is no evidence that the plaintiff corporation has ever
tendered Beisel any stock. The relation between the parties was
that of a mere promise to pay on the part of the defendant, conditional on the performance by the parties of the agreed stipula-
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tions. It is the opinion of the court that Beisel never became a
stockholder of the Copper Co. In this respect the case at bar differs from that of Bole v. Fulton, 233 Pa. 609, where there was a
tender of stock by the plaintiff corporation.
Although we do not consider it necessary to a decision of the
case, counsel for the plaintiff having argued at length on the question of whether or not this was a delivery in escrow, which escrow was destroyed by the delivery to the treasurer, and a binding
contract resulting, it is well here to state the present law on that
point. In the case of Cass v. Pittsburg Ry. Co., supra, the subscription was delivered to an agent, and the court said: "When
such contract is made with an agent he may well agree to hold it
as an escrow." It has been held that a good delivery in escrow
may be made to a single director, Ottawa R. Co. v. Hall, 1 Ill.
App. 612; to a committee appointed by the inhabitants of a town;
Beloit R. Co. v. Palmer, 19 Wis. 574; or even to the president of
a corporation, Gilman v. Gross, 97 Wis. 224. In the case of Great
West. Tel. Co. v. Lowenthal, 154 Ill. 261, 40 N. E. 318, it is said:
"A subscription delivered to the soliciting agent of a corporation,
in escrow, with directions not to deliver it to the company until
the subscriber has had an opportunity to make further investigations into its character, and who investigated, and forbids the delivery, does not constitute an irrevocable contract of subscription,
and the subscriber is not liable thereon".
Whether we consider this as a mere promise to pay, on the
performance of a condition, or as a delivery in escrow, to become
binding on the performance of the condition, we find no grounds on
which Beisel, in the case at bar, can be held liable to the plaintiff
in this suit.
Reversed, with v. f. d. n.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The able opinion of the court below makes unnecessary a discussion of the principles involved in this case. The conclusion
reached by it accords with Growler Copper Co. v. Teti, 221 Pa. 36.
Affirmed.

